Editorial Notes

[Editorial Notes] Putting the SAGAR vision to the test

As External Affairs Minister signalled at the fourth Indian Ocean Conference in 2019, India’s SAGAR vision is intended to be “consultative, democratic and equitable”. India’s recent admission as observer to the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) will put this vision to the test.
By IASToppers
April 22, 2020


  • Introduction
  • About Indian Ocean Commission
  • IOC and India
  • MASE Programme
  • Efforts of IOC to make maritime security stronger
  • How can India contribute?
  • Conclusion

Putting the SAGAR vision to the test

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  • In March 2015, Prime Minister of India visited three small but significant Indian Ocean island states — Seychelles, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka.
  • During this tour, he unveiled India’s strategic vision for the Indian Ocean: Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).
  • SAGAR seeks to differentiate India’s leadership from the modus operandi of other regionally active major powers and to reassure littoral states as India’s maritime influence grows.

About Indian Ocean Commission

  • Following a request from New Delhi, the IOC granted observer status to India on March 6 at the Commission’s 34th Council of Ministers.
  • Founded in 1982, the IOC is an intergovernmental organisation comprising five small-island states in the Western Indian Ocean: the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (a French department), and Seychelles.
  • Decisions in the IOC are consensus-based.

IOC and India

  • Over the years, the IOC has emerged as an active and trusted regional actor, working in and for the Western Indian Ocean.
  • More recently, the IOC has demonstrated leadership in the maritime security domain.
  • Since maritime security is a prominent feature of India’s relations with Indian Ocean littoral states, India’s interest in the IOC should be understood in this context.
  • However, India has preferred to engage bilaterally with smaller states in the region. What India will not find in the IOC is a cluster of small states seeking a partnership of a big country like India.
  • The IOC has its own regional agenda, and has made impressive headway in the implementation of a regional maritime security architecture in the Western Indian Ocean.

MASE Programme

In 2012, the IOC was one of the four regional organisations to launch the MASE Programme — the European Union-funded programme to promote Maritime Security in Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean.

Under MASE, the IOC has established a mechanism for surveillance and control of the Western Indian Ocean with two regional centres.

  1. The Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC), based in Madagascar, is designed to deepen maritime domain awareness by monitoring maritime activities and promoting information sharing and exchange.
  2. The Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC), based in Seychelles, will eventually facilitate coordinated interventions at sea based on information gathered through the RMIFC.

These centres are a response to the limitations that the states in the region face in policing and patrolling their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

Seven states in the region have signed agreements to participate in this multilateral maritime security architecture, and once ratified, will provide its legal foundation. Many major powers have expressed interest in accessing the RMIFC.

Efforts of IOC to make maritime security stronger

  • The IOC has also wielded a disproportionate degree of convening power. In 2018 and 2019, it served as Chair of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).
  • Leveraging the CGPCS Chair, the IOC held ministerial meetings in 2018 and 2019 on maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean, drawing state representations from the region plus major powers such as India, the EU, the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Russia.
  • The IOC’s achievements offer an opportunity for India to learn, and also to support. The IOC style of ‘bottom-up regionalism’ has produced a sub-regional view and definition of maritime security problems and local ownership of pathways towards workable solutions.
  • The IOC has been seeking more sustainable ways of addressing maritime security threats in the region, with the RMIFC and RCOC as part of this response.
  • Its regional maritime security architecture is viewed locally as the most effective and sustainable framework to improve maritime control and surveillance and allow littoral States to shape their own destiny.
  • Moreover, with proper regional coordination, local successes at curbing maritime threats will have broader security dividends for the Indian Ocean space.

How can India contribute?

  • The IOC’s maritime security activities have a strong foundation, but they require support and buy-in from additional regional actors.
  • India has already signalled a strong interest in the work of the IOC through its request to be admitted as an observer. 
  • Nearly all littoral states in the Western Indian Ocean need assistance in developing their maritime domain awareness and in building capacity to patrol their EEZs.
  • With its observer status, India will be called upon to extend its expertise to the region, put its satellite imagery to the service of the RMIFC, and establish links with its own Information Fusion Centre.


If India seeks to calibrate its Indian Ocean strategy away from outdated, neoimperialist conceptions of great power that are costly to regional followership, one route will be to learn from and support sub-regional efforts such as those of the IOC.

As a major stakeholder in the Indian Ocean with maritime security high on the agenda, India will continue to pursue its interests and tackle maritime security challenges at the macro level in the region.

However, as an observer of the IOC, a specific, parallel opportunity to embrace bottom-up regionalism presents itself. There are those in the Western Indian Ocean who are closely watching how India’s “consultative, democratic and equitable” leadership will take shape.

Mains 2020 Editorial Notes

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